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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JACKY BOBO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890606-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from one second degree and one third 
degree felony conviction. This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953) (Cum. Supp. 1989) and 
77-35-26(2)(a) (1953) (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a conviction and final judgment 
entered against appellant in the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, presiding, 
Appellant was convicted of one count of Possession of A Con-
trolled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, 
as amended), and one count of Unlawful Possession of Cocaine 
Without Tax Stamps Affixed, a third degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-106 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 6, 1988, the State charged appellant by 
information in Counts I and II with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended), both second degree 
felonies. Count III charged appellant with possession of a 
controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1953, as amended), a Class B misdemeanor. In Counts 
IV and V, respectively, appellant was charged with unlawful 
possession of cocaine and psilocybin without tax stamps affixed, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §59-19-106 (1953, as amended), 
both third degree felonies. On August 11, 1989, appellant filed 
a Motion to Suppress and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof. 
On August 15, 1989, the trial court found probable cause for the 
searches and seizures, and denied appellant's motion to suppress. 
(R. 77) 
Appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea in the 
district court to Counts I and IV (R. 29), reserving his right to 
appeal his arrest and the subsequent search of his apartment as 
violative of the state and federal constitutions. (R. 69) The 
other counts were dismissed upon the motion of the County 
Attorney. 
Based on the conditional guilty plea to Counts I and IV, 
the court sentenced appellant to one to fifteen years in prison 
on the second degree felony and zero to five years on the third 
degree felony, with both commitments to run concurrently with 
each other. The court, however, stayed the execution of the 
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sentence and placed appellant on probation (R. 82), and ordered 
him to serve six months in jail. The court then issued a certif-
icate of probable cause and allowed appellant to post bail 
pending this appeal. 
Appellant requests this court to reverse the trial court's 
ruling on his motion to suppress (R. 77), which ruling determined 
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his apart-
ment. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did appellant, who was told by a peace officer that the 
County Attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant, 
voluntarily consent to the search of his apartment without coer-
cion or duress, as required by the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution? 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person or life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be secured, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 6, 1988, officers from the Layton City Police 
Department were called to a disturbance at the residence of the 
appellant (R.18, Preliminary Hearing transcript, hereinafter 
"Tr." at 1-2). Upon arrival, officer Kevin Allred and a com-
panion officer observed a loud party going on (Tr.2). The 
officers knocked on the door and appellant answered (Tr.2). The 
officers indicated to him that they had a report of a loud party 
involving juveniles (Tr.2). Appellant then opened the door and 
invited the officers inside to observe that there were no 
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juveniles nor was there a loud party (Tr.2). Upon entering, the 
officers observed several individuals and a pipe that smelled 
like marijuana (Tr.2). 
The pipe was seized and appellant was placed under arrest 
(Tr.3). A search of his person resulted in the discovery of a 
small bottle containing a white substance that appeared to be 
cocaine (Tr.3). Appellant was handcuffed and secured on a sofa 
in the living room (Tr.3). The officers requested that he 
consent to a search of the apartment (Tr.3). Appellant did not 
reply to the request (Tr.3). 
The officers then contacted a deputy county attorney to 
request that a warrant be prepared (Tr.3). Narcotics detectives 
were also summoned and subsequently arrived at the scene (Tr.4). 
Detective David Nance of the Davis County Metro Narcotics arrived 
at the residence (Tr.4). Detective Nance told appellant that the 
officers were in the process of preparing a search warrant and if 
appellant would consent to the search of the apartment, that 
would speed up the process (Tr.15). Appellant, indicating that 
he was in a hurry to get it over with, agreed to allow the 
officers to search the residence (Tr.16). During the course of 
the search, a bag of psilocybin mushrooms was found as was a bag 
of cocaine (Tr.16). 
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The state charged appellant in five counts with the 
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, 
possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of 
controlled substances without tax stamps affixed (R.7). Appel-
lant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession 
of controlled substance with intent to distribute and one count 
of unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps affixed 
(R.29), reserving his right to appeal the underlying arrest and 
search of his apartment (R.69). 
On October 10, 1989, the District Court granted 
appellant's conditional guilty plea, on the ground "that there 
are meritorious issues in [this] case that should be decided by 
the Utah Court of Appeals" (R.69). The court, however, denied 
appellant's motion to suppress. The court held that appellant 
voluntarily consented to the search which resulted in the discov-
ery of the evidence (R.78). The court, therefore, sentenced 
Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), holding that 
a narcotic defendant could appeal denial of his motion to 
suppress following his no-contest plea, which was explicitly 
conditioned on his preservation of his right to appeal the 
suppression issue if the lower court denied his motion and to 
withdraw the plea if the appellate court finds for him. The 
court noted with approval that other jurisdictions have found 
equally proper the acceptance of conditional guilty plea agreed 
to by the parties and the court. See, e.g., State v. Crosby, 388 
So.2d 584 (La. 1976) and People v. Reid, 362 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 
1984). 
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appellant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 
1-15 years on the conviction of possession off a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute and 0-5 years on the convic-
tion of unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps 
affixed. The sentences were ordered to run concurrent (R.30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court requires that a citizen voluntarily 
consent to the search of his person and things before the consti-
tutionality of a warrantless search may be established. The 
trial court in the instant case improperly found that appellant 
voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment. Because 
the officer intimated that the County Attorney was in the process 
of drafting a search warranty appellant's consent was coercively 
or deceptively obtained and hence involuntary. Even if the 
officer had claimed that a magistrate, as opposed to a county 
attorney, a non-neutral state agent, was in the process of pre-
paring a search warrant, such statement, if untrue, would be 
violative of the constitutional prohibition against consent 
obtained by coercion or duress. This court should, therefore, 
find appellant's consent to the search involuntary because it was 
obtained by deceit and coercion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS APART-
MENT AND THAT THE OFFICERS ACTED WITHIN THE "CON-
SENT EXCEPTION" TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that a police officer obtain a search warrant before 
searching a citizen, his house and his effects. United States v. 
Ventressca. 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 
There is, however, a limited exception to this warrant require-
ment. 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the 
Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, the Court 
noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a 
search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent. The question 
dealt with was what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate 
that a consent was "voluntarily" given. 
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that 
"voluntariness" required for a consent to search should be the 
same as the voluntariness showing required in a police 
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interrogation. The Court stated that any coercion, explicit or 
implicit, would negate a voluntary consent. Further, the 
Government need not show that the person had been specifically 
warned of his right to refuse a consent search. In doing so, the 
Court also rejected the defendant's claim that the consent to 
search was like a waiver of a constitutional right at a criminal 
trial. The Court held that a knowing and intelligent waiver, as 
in the waiver of counsel at trial, was not required. It stated 
that the test to be applied is the traditional test of voluntari-
ness. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that 
the consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not the 
result of duress or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is a 
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. 
Id. 
The Court then discussed some of the factors to be 
considered when applying this totality of the circumstances 
test. Those include: the defendant's intelligence, whether or 
not the defendant was in custody, the nature of the police ques-
tioning and the environment in which it took place, the defen-
dant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent, and any other 
circumstances that weigh on the issue of voluntariness. 
In the instant case, appellant was in police custody, 
having been arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia 
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(Tr.10). He had been subjected to intense questioning by the 
officers (Tr.12). Several officers at various times asked appel-
lant to consent to the search (Tr.12). Without knowledge that he 
could withhold his consent, appellant at one point told the 
officers that he had not said they could not search (Tr.12). 
Moreover, the officers told appellant that they were in the 
process of preparing a search warrant. Appellant, like any 
reasonable man, could and did conclude that the officers in a 
matter of time would show up with the constitutionally required 
warrant. In addition, there were elements of intimidation and 
coercion under the circumstances of this case. Because appellant 
refused on several occasions to consent to the search (Tr.12), 
the officers "took turns" in pressuring him to submission. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
search in the instant case, the trial court erred in concluding 
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search (R.78). 
The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search 
has also been addressed by the Supreme Court in other contexts. 
The primary issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1980), were whether 
airport authorities had illegally stopped the defendant and if 
she then voluntarily consented to accompany agents to an office. 
The Court found that the authorities acted properly in stopping 
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and asking the defendant for identification. The Court went on 
to find that the defendant had consented to go to the office of 
the Drug Enforcement Administration. The officers had not kept 
the defendant's airline ticket or identification. The Court 
found that the officers' actions could give the defendant the 
impression that she did not have to accompany them. 
Conversely, in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), it was held that a stop of an indi-
vidual on less than probable cause cannot justify a detention in 
a small room by two police officers. The officers had retained 
the defendant's airline ticket and identification. They then had 
his luggage brought to the room where he was held. The Court 
found that such a situation would result in the defendant's 
belief that he was under arrest. Because the defendant had not 
been informed that he was free to board his plane and he actually 
believed he was being detained, it was held that the encounter 
had lost its consensual nature. The Court went on to hold that, 
as a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since there was 
no probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal. Thus, 
the evidence was ordered suppressed. The Court then made some 
observations about the nature of searches based on consent: 
where the validity of a search rests on consent, 
the State has the burden of proving that the neces-
sary consent was obtained and that it was freely 
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and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satis-
fied by showing a mere submission to a claim of 
lawful authority. Id. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a 
similar issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th 
Cir. 1985). In that case, the defendant had been stopped for 
speeding in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license. 
The car was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran an 
NCIC check to determine if the vehicle had been reported as 
stolen. That check was negative. He then requested assistance 
from a backup officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that 
the defendant was transporting narcotics. The officer returned 
to the defendant's car and told Recalde he could either plead not 
guilty or sign the ticket. When it was signed, the officer asked 
the defendant to step out of the car and then asked for permis-
sion to inspect the trunk. During the inspection, the officer 
found that some of the screws in the molding had been tampered 
with. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany 
him to a nearby town, which the defendant agreed to do. At no 
time had the officer returned the defendant's driver's license, 
the vehicle registration, or the traffic ticket. At the police 
station the defendant consented to the search of the car. 
In analyzing the issue of whether the trip was made with 
the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a three tier 
analysis described as follows: 
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First, there must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was unequivocal and specific. 
Second, the Government must establish that the 
consent was given without duress or coercion. 
Finally, we evaluate those first two standards with 
the traditional indulgence of the courts against a 
presumption of waiver of constitutional rights. 
761 F.2d at 1453. 
In determining the issue of duress or coercion in 
obtaining consent to search, the Utah Supreme Court has described 
a number of factors that should be considered. In State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Ut. 1980), the court stated, 
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of estab-
lishing from the totality of the circumstances that 
the consent was voluntary given; however, the 
prosecution is not required to prove that defendant 
knew of his right to refuse to consent in order to 
show voluntariness. Factors which may show a lack 
of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of 
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) 
the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) coopera-
tion by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer. [Footnote omitted] 
621 P.2d at 106. 
Several other cases from the Utah Court have held that the 
question regarding a Fourth Amendment violation turns on the 
2 
issue of reasonableness . Under that test, courts are to balance 
2
 State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Ut. 1978); State v. Kelsey, 532 
P.2d 1001 (Ut. 1975); State v. Kaae. 30 Ut.2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 
(Ut. 1973). 
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the interests of society against that of the individual. 
However, in State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Ut. 1981), three of 
the justices expressly rejected this standard as it failed to 
comport with the requirements of the United States Supreme 
Court's rulings on the Fourth Amendment. The majority of the 
court adopted the standard that searches not made pursuant to a 
valid warrant were per se unreasonable and subject to the well 
delineated exceptions. That standard comports with those 
outlined in Bustamonte, supra, and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543 (1968). 
In Bumper v. North Carolina, the defendant was convicted 
of rape. The defendant was a black male who lived with his 
The court would typically describe this test as follows, 
In regard to the propriety of the search: it 
is to be had in mind that the constitutional 
protections are only against unreasonable 
searches. The test to be applied is whether 
under all of the circumstances, fair-minded 
persons, giving due consideration to the 
rights and interest of the public, as well as 
to those of the suspect, would judge the 
search to be unreasonable intrusion into the 
latterfs rights. A further important 
observation is that the just-stated test to 
gauge the validity of a search without a 
warrant is satisfied if consent is given to 
the search, as was done here; and that these 
rules apply even when the suspect is in 
custody. [Footnotes omitted] State v. 
White, supra, at 553-554. 
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elderly grandmother in rural North Carolina. White officers went 
to the home, told the grandmother that they had a search warrant, 
and requested to search the home. The grandmother told them to 
go ahead and search. At the hearing on the motion to suppress 
the State neither relied upon nor produced a search warrant. The 
Court noted that the State has the burden of showing that the 
consent was freely and voluntarily given. Furthermore, the 
Court stated that this burden could not be discharged by a 
showing of acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Id. at 
548-49. 
The Court then held that a search conducted pursuant to a 
warrant cannot be justified by consent if the warrant is later 
found to be invalid. The Court went on to state: 
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to 
search a home under a warrant, he announces in 
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the 
search. The situation is instinct with coercion — 
albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is 
coercion there cannot be consent. 
391 U.S. at 550. 
The evidence in this case did not show that the detective 
indicated that he did, in fact, have a warrant. However, the 
evidence clearly showed that the detective implied that it would 
only be a matter of time before a warrant would be produced 
(Tr.15). The detective intimated to appellant that the "County 
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Attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant" 
(Tr.15). He, however, did not explain to appellant the proper 
procedures for obtaining a warrant. Nor did he inform appellant 
that he need not give his consent to the search. Under such 
circumstances, the detective's statements amount to a claim of 
lawful authority to search pursuant to a warrant, even though he 
did not have such authority. Under the Bumpers rule, the consent 
was not voluntarily given. 
Similarly, a notable commentator in the area of searches 
and seizures observed that: 
A mere threat by the police to obtain a warrant if 
consent is withheld is not sufficient to consti-
tute coercion because the police are only informing 
the individual of a course of action they are 
entitled to take. Some courts have distinguished 
between statements by the police that a person 
"might as well consent" because a warrant could 
easily be obtained, and statements that the police 
would "attempt" to obtain a warrant or could "prob-
ably" obtain one. While the former type of state-
ment implies that a warrant will issue as a matter 
of course, the latter more accurately reflects the 
necessity that a neutral magistrate pass upon the 
probable cause for a search before a warrant 
issues. 
Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions, Clark 
Boardman Co., Ltd. 1989, pp. 9-14. 
The officer's statement in the instant case falls into the 
category of statements "imply[ing] that a warrant will issue as a 
matter of course." Id. The officer not only threatened to 
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obtain a search warrant but implied that one was being drafted. 
On direct examination, officer Nance said "[he] explained to 
[appellant] that the County Attorney was in the process of pre-
paring a search warrant • . ." (Tr.15). That statement indicates 
that the County Attorney was authorized to issue a search 
warrant. The statement did not advise appellant that only an 
independent and detached magistrate could issue a search 
warrant, based on probable cause. State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1983). The instant case, therefore, somewhat resembles 
Bumpers. The officer's statement which induced appellant's 
consent had elements of coercion and deception, which the Supreme 
Court has found invalid to support a claim of voluntary consent 
to search. Bumpers, supra: Bustamonte, supra. Thus, this court 
should find that defendant's consent to the search of his 
apartment was involuntary. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH 
OF HIS APARTMENT AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) and State v. 
Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986), a majority of the Supreme Court 
of Utah concluded that Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah may be interpreted to provide broader protections than 
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the Fourth Amendment. Although this would not be the result of 
4 
any textual differences between the two provisions, a state 
court may interpret its own constitution independent of the 
federal decisions and such decisions would not be subject to 
federal review or reversal. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983). 
Thus, with respect to the consent issue, under a purely 
state law analysis, the courts should require that officers 
inform defendants that they have the right to refuse to allow the 
search of their person or property. Likewise, if a defendant is 
truly free to terminate an encounter with a police officer, the 
state courts should require defendants to be so informed before a 
voluntary consent may be established. In other words, the State 
courts should adopt a knowing and intentional standard for waiver 
of search and seizure rights. 
Such rulings, based solely on the State Constitution could 
alleviate a number of confusing areas related to the law of 
search and seizure. It would simplify the job of law enforce-
ment, in that officers would not need to be concerned with the 
somewhat confusing rulings from the federal courts. They would 
merely have to follow the stricter state requirements. Secondly, 
4 
Both provisions share nearly identical language. 
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such positions would preclude interference and confusion of state 
legal issues by the federal courts. In a concurring opinion in 
State v. Johnson , 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), Justice Zimmerman 
described the confusion in the federal search and seizure case 
law. In doing so he quoted from an opinion he authored earlier 
in State v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). He stated: 
. . . much of the existing federal fourth 
amendment warrantless search and seizure law 
is rather Kafkaesque, consisting as it does 
of rules built upon a series of contradictory 
and confusing rationalizations and distinc-
tions. Police officers and judges attempting 
to make their way through this labyrinth 
often imperil both the rights of individuals 
and the integrity and effectiveness of law 
enforcement. [711 P.2d at 271-72] 
745 P.2d at 456. The rulings that are suggested here could avoid 
these problems. 
Applying the standard set forth above to the instant case, 
appellant's purported consent to the search of his apartment 
does not measure up to Utah Constitutional requirements in 
Article I, Section 14. That section should be interpreted as 
requiring a peace officer to inform a suspect that he has a 
constitutional right to withhold consent to a search of his 
person or effects. Because appellant's consent was unknowing and 
a result of deceit and coercionr this court should reverse the 
trial court's conclusion that appellant voluntarily consented to 
the search of his apartment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's agreement to allow the detectives to search 
his residence was not voluntarily given as required by the Con-
stitution of the Stte of Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The evidence, 
including the mushrooms and cocaine, that was seized after the 
search based on the involuntary consent should have been ordered 
suppressed. The trial court erred in finding that appellant's 
consent was voluntarily made. This court should reverse the 
trial court by holding that the consent did not meet constitu-
tional standard. 
DATED this H day of December, 1989. 
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Appellant's Brief to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
. (QPi * -
- 21 -
A D D E N D U M 
FILED in
 r , .„ 
n4
^3\c^;sorF/C£ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL jflSJRICTTAH 
lii
 ilsiAH'QQ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE .OF UTAH ** QJ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACKIE EUGENE BOBO, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 6346 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, having come on 
regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, and 
counsel having stipulated that the matter be submitted based upon 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the memorandum 
submitted by counsel and the Court having reviewed the transcript 
and the memorandum submitted, and being fully advised in the 
premises, rules as follows: 
The defendant at the time of the search was under 
arrest in his own home by officers who had probable cause to be 
there. He was asked if they could search his residence, and he 
did not respond. The officers proceeded to contact the County 
Attorney's Office for a warrant to search and the defendant was 
informed that they were doing that. 
There was no force exhibited, and no threats were made 
to the defendant. A subsequent request for search was made, and 
the defendant responded that Mhe never said they couldn't, and 
that they could go ahead and search-. The defendant was 
imo 
cooperative. No tricks were employed by the law enforcement 
officers, when they said they were attempting to get a warrant, 
they were in the process of getting a warrant from the county 
attorney• 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent to search, the Court concludes that 
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, and therefore, the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this )S*K day of August, A.D., 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
)isxrict Court Judge Dis 
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